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HINDSIGHT BIAS AND THE
SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES
RULE:
FIXING THE FEASIBILITY EXCEPTION
"HINDSIGHT IS 20/20."
Nowhere has this maxim been more true than in the American
courts of civil law when dealing with negligence and liability. To be
sure, hindsight is 20/20; we always know what we should have done
after something happens, but why? And in the context of a legal pro-
ceeding, where jurors are supposed to determine liability based on the
defendant's actions before the injury occurred, is this fair?
Under traditional, or de jure, negligence law, a plaintiff must prove
four elements: first, that the defendant owed him a duty of reasonable
care; second, that the defendant breached that duty; third, that the
breach was the actual cause of the damage or injury to the plaintiff;
and fourth, that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause, or
legal cause, of the plaintiff's injury.1 The law requires that juries de-
cide the second element - whether the defendant breached his duty to
the plaintiff - based on the defendant's actions before the accident.
This prescription that the jury take an ex ante viewpoint poses a great
financial risk and danger to the defendant that what is called "hind-
sight bias" will negatively affect the outcome, especially where evi-
See generally, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965); WILLIAM PROSSER &
PAUL KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984). See also Wilson v. Sibert, 535 P.2d 1034
(Alaska 1975) (detailing the general duty owed to plaintiffs); Ind. Consol. Ins. Co. v. Mathew,
402 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing the element of breach of duty); Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (discussing and defining cause in fact and
proximate cause in negligence actions).
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dence of subsequent remedial measures is introduced to show the
feasibility of that measure.
The Subsequent Remedial Measures Rule of the Federal Rules of
Evidence2 is an attempt to mitigate the hindsight bias that is inherent
in negligence trials by providing a general rule of exclusion of such
evidence to show negligence. Evidence of a subsequent remedial
measure is only admissible to show feasibility, control or ownership,
if controverted. The Subsequent Remedial Measures rule states, in
pertinent part, that
[w]hen, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event,
measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have
made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
negligence ... [or] culpable conduct .... This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures
when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership,
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if contro-
verted, or impeachment.3
However, the definition of "feasible" varies from circuit to circuit,
leaving open the possibility that, while the evidence may not be ad-
missible to show negligence, it may be admissible to show the meas-
ure's feasibility under a definition of "feasible" that strongly resem-
bles "reasonable."
For example, in Kenny v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transporta-
tion Authority,4 a young woman was seated at a bench on an elevated
train platform at approximately 9:00 p.m., waiting for her train.
There was only one other person on the platform at the time - a man
on the opposite side of the tracks. The man crossed over to the
woman's side of the platform, and after a brief exchange, dragged her
approximately 150 feet to a darkened end of the platform. There, he
beat and raped her.5
After the incident, the young woman filed suit against the transit
authority and the City of Philadelphia, alleging negligence.6 At trial,
a transit employee testified that the platform's lighting was checked
on a daily basis, and that he had replaced at least one light bulb about
2 FED. R. EviD. 407.
3 Id.
4 581 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1978).
5 Id. at 352.
6 Id. The City of Philadelphia was dismissed from the suit after presenting proof that the
transit authority had knowledge of the dangerous condition on the platform and failed to remedy
it. Id. at 354.
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an hour before the incident. However, on cross-examination, the
woman's counsel elicited the fact that a new fluorescent lighting fix-
ture was installed only a few days after the attack.7 While the District
Court ultimately held that the lack of lighting was not a proximate
cause of the woman's attack, the evidence was admitted for both im-
peachment and to show the feasibility of precautions.8
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the testimony that fluores-
cent lighting was installed four days after the rape was admissible
because "when the defendant opens up the issue by claiming that all
reasonable care was being exercised at the time, [then] the plaintiff
may attack that contention by showing later repairs which are incon-
sistent with it." 9 In articulating this definition, the court drew a nearly
indiscernible line between evidence offered for impeachment and
evidence to show feasibility where controverted. While the definition
may have been intended to speak only to the impeachment excep-
tion,'' it was couched as a response and affirmation of the admission
under both the impeachment and feasibility exception. The ultimate
result of such a definition is less a fine line and more a broad defini-
tion of "feasibility."
The Third Circuit, however, is not alone in opening the door to a
less-than-narrow definition of "feasibility." In many jurisdictions, if a
defendant merely argues that the measure was not practical or eco-
nomical, that argument is enough to controvert the plaintiff's asser-
tion that the measure was "feasible," thus rendering the evidence ad-
missible." Now that the evidence is admitted, how will the jury re-
act? A close examination of the subsequent remedial measures rule,
its purposes, and the decision-making process called "hindsight bias"
may help to answer this question.
This Note argues that hindsight bias causes evidence of subsequent
remedial measures, admitted to show feasibility, to ultimately speak
I Id. at 355-56.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 356. The trial court held that the evidence was admissible to show feasibility and
for impeachment purposes. Id. at 355-56. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
admission for both purposes. Id.
10 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 920 F.2d 1560, 1567 (1 1th Cir.
1991) (noting that, while the evidence was being used for impeachment purposes, the exception
"may well possess the capacity to engulf the rule"); Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 887 F.2d
34, 38 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying this definition to an impeachment issue).
I See, e.g., Espeaignette v. Gene Tierney Co., Inc., 43 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1994) (defining
"feasible" as "practical"); Anderson v. Malloy, 700 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1983) (defining
"feasible" as "possible"); Brookshire Bros. v. Lewis, 911 S.W.2d 791, 797 (Tex. App. 1995)
(applying Texas Rule of Evidence 407 to conclude that a clear controversion of the possibility,
economic feasibility, or efficacy of the measure is required before evidence of the measure can
be admitted).
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directly to the defendant's negligence, an outcome that is supposed to
be prohibited by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part I describes
hindsight bias and explains how hindsight bias can influence juries'
perceptions in negligence cases. Part II details how the subsequent
remedial measures rule is currently applied, and how a broad defini-
tion of the term "feasible" has led to the admission of evidence that
was intended by Congress to be admissible in only limited circum-
stances. Part HI explains how hindsight bias specifically affects ju-
ries' perceptions of subsequent remedial measures that are admitted to
show feasibility. Part IV suggests remedies that, on their own or in
combination with each other, may mitigate hindsight bias' effect on
evidence of subsequent remedial measures.
I. HINDSIGHT BIAS
A. Is Hindsight Really 20/20?
"The ex post perspective of litigation exerts a hydraulic force that
distorts judgment."12
Most people know the old maxim that "hindsight is 20/20." Per-
haps without knowing it, many people engage in hindsight bias;
"Monday-morning quarterbacking" is perhaps its most well-known
manifestation.' 3 But what, exactly, is hindsight bias, and how might
it adversely affect a defendant in a negligence case?
The basic theory of hindsight bias was developed in 1975 by Ba-
ruch Fischhoff.14  Although Fischhoff's first research topics were
primarily historical events and psychotherapy patients' case histories,
the theory has gained wide recognition as a fundamental psychologi-
cal tendency. Hindsight bias is the tendency to regard events that
have already occurred as having always been inevitable.' 5 As a gen-
eral rule, finding out that an outcome has already occurred increases
that outcome's perceived ex ante likelihood.' 6 People tend to believe
12 Carroll v. Otis Elevator, 896 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1990).
13 Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclu-
sions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1299 (1999).
14 Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight * Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judg-
ment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUMAN PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE
288 (1975).
15 Id. at 288-89. What is now known as hindsight bias was previously called "creeping
determinism" by other psychologists and researchers. Id. See also Hal R. Arkes et al., Hind-
sight Bias Among Physicians Weighing the Likelihood of Diagnoses, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
252, 252-54 (1981).
16 Fischhoff, supra note 14, at 297.
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that this perceived inevitability was apparent in foresight as well as
with hindsight, 17 and generally remember their own outcome predic-
tions as being more accurate than they actually were. This is essen-
tially what happens when one states "I knew it all along," even when
one did not know it all along. 18 Fischhoff postulated that it "not only
biases people's impressions of what they would have known without
outcome knowledge, but also their impressions of what they them-
selves and others actually did know in foresight."'
19
This tendency may be particularly relevant when instructing juries
to make retrospective decisions as to whether the defendant's actions
were reasonable at the time of the injury in negligence actions. Sub-
jects have shown a tendency "to exaggerate in hindsight what they
knew in foresight" and to underestimate the substance and amount of
facts of which they were not aware. They also "exaggerate what
could have been anticipated [with] foresight," 21 perceive what has
happened as being inevitable, and believe that others should have
been able to anticipate outcomes better than they actually did.22 Be-
cause of this reinterpretation of what others should have known or
should have been able to anticipate, jurors may believe the defen-
dant's behavior to be less reasonable in hindsight than it would have
been in foresight. 23  As Fischhoff noted, "[w]hen second-guessed by
a hindsightful observer, [a defendant's] misfortune appears to have
been incompetence, folly, or worse.
'24
Psychologists have tested Fischhoff s theory by exposing physi-
cians to medical case history materials, then providing one "foresight-
only" control group with no pre-determined diagnoses, and each of
the other four "hindsight" groups with lists of four possible diagnoses,
identifying one of the four diagnoses as "correct., 25 The hindsight
groups that had been given each of the least likely diagnoses deter-
17 Id.
I8 Id.
19 Id. See also Hal R. Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 305, 305 (1988) (noting that "[h]indsight bias is defined as the tendency for people
considering a past event to overestimate their likelihood of having predicted its occurrence").
20 BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK 42 (1981). Specifically, people may ac-
tually ignore facts of which they were actually aware if, after being made aware of a particular
event, those facts do not mesh with the actual outcome. Id.
21 Chris William Sanchirico, Finding Error, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2003).
22 Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in
Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel
Kahneman et al., eds., 1982) (offering a thorough analysis of potential causes of the bias).
23 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 571, 571 (1998).
24 Fischhoff, supra note 14, at 298.
25 Arkes et al., supra note 15, at 252-54.
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mined that the identified "correct" diagnosis was more probable than
the foresight-only group did. Psychologists concluded that the hind-
sight groups were trying to make sense of the given outcome by
working backwards rather than considering the data in a forward con-
tinuum. 26  In other words, Fischhoff's hindsight bias was found to
distort second opinions of medical practitioners, and this conclusion
has been confirmed by studies of undergraduate 27 and postgraduate
28
medical students. 8
In a subsequent study, published in 1977, Fischhoff re-examined
the "knew it all along" effect of hindsight bias.29 Fischhoff concluded
that, while there were times when subjects felt that they never would
have known the answer to a question, in general, subjects exaggerated
how much they would have known had they not been told the answer
in advance. 30 This response was even more prevalent in group situa-
tions, leading Fischhoff to suggest that people in group settings were
capable of generating feelings of having known something about even
the most obscure facts.'
Fischhoff then compared the results of his 1977 study with those
of his hindsight bias study in 1975. He hypothesized that in both
situations subjects were essentially seeking to integrate the answer or
outcome with everything else they knew about the subject.32 In inte-
grating the answer or outcome, subjects reinterpreted previously held
information in light of the reported answer or outcome; 33 the process
is so natural and immediate-and appropriate, when done
correctly-that people are generally unaware that they are doing it.34
Because of this integration process, people tend to "overestimate how
obVious the answer appeared (memory) or would have appeared (hy-
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Neal V. Dawson et al., Hindsight Bias: An Impediment to Accurate Probability Estima-
tion in Clinicopathologic Conferences, 8 MED. DECISION MAKING 259, 259-64 (1988) (conclud-
ing that clinicopathologic conferences, although valued teaching tools, are susceptible to the
hindsight bias).
29 Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 349, 356 (1977). The "knew it all along" effect can be
viewed in most people's every day experiences, for instance, while watching a game show like
Jeopardy. The question is presented, and before the viewer can respond, a contestant answers
correctly. The viewer then normally says something like "Oh, I knew that," whether he actually
knew it or not.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. See also Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on For-
bidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REv. 1857, 1858 (2001) (noting that blindfolding techniques do not
generally work because jurors often discuss forbidden topics).
33 Fischhoff, supra note 29, at 356.
34 Id.
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pothetical) before its correctness was affirmed. 35 Even when warned
of the integration process and told specifically not to engage in it, "it
is evidently extremely difficult to de-process so important a bit of
information as the right answer. 36
A concurrent study by Roth and Meisel analyzed how the hind-
sight bias could affect determinations of negligence in Tarasoff-type
malpractice cases.37 Roth and Meisel correctly noted that
[u]nfortunately, what is reasonable in a given situation cannot
be determined with scientific precision, and when it is deter-
mined by a jury it is always after the harm has been done.
Although the jury is cautioned that reasonableness must be
judged without the benefit of hindsight, knowledge of the oc-
currence of untoward events... cannot easily be put aside.
38
Subsequent studies have found that in similar factual settings, indi-
vidual "judges" are significantly affected by the hindsight bias, par-
ticularly the knowledge of the "untoward event., 39 The determination
of negligence is influenced by the report of damages or harm even
where the therapist or defendant acted in a manner consistent with the
professional standard of care, or, in other words, where the duty of
care was not breached.4n Specifically, the hindsight bias was most
palpable in the jurors' determinations of the foreseeability of the
wrongful behavior.4' In cases where a subsequent remedial measure
might be admitted into evidence, the Roth and Meisel study and the
LaBine study clearly indicate that the danger to the defendant of the
hindsight bias affecting jurors' perceptions of foreseeability might
significantly hinder their case.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Loren H. Roth & Alan Meisel, Dangerousness, Confidentiality, and the Duty to Warn,
134 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 508 (1977). In Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of California,
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), the defendants-a therapist and the police-failed to confine a patient
who had expressed his intention to kill the victim, and also failed to warn the victim that the
patient had the intent to kill her. After the patient killed the victim, her parents sued, alleging
that the defendants owed the victim the duty to warn of the impending danger.
38 Id. at 509.
39 Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias,
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 510 (1996).
4 Id.
41 Id. at 511. The LaBine study's findings are consistent with estimates made by other re-
searchers, who found that as many as 18-27% of observers may change their decision from
negligent to not negligent when they know that an event has occurred and the evaluative task is
unfamiliar to them. Id. (citing J.J. Christensen-Szalanzki & C. F. Willham, The Hindsight Bias:
A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147 (1991)).
Therefore, because most jurors are not familiar with professional standards or what constitutes
reasonable care, the hindsight bias can significantly impact the outcome of a case.
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The danger to defendants presented by the hindsight bias in com-
bination with evidence of subsequent remedial measures was demon-
strated in Kenny, where jurors were presented with evidence that fluo-
rescent lighting was installed only four days after a rape occurred.42
Jurors were instructed not to consider the installation of lights as evi-
dence of culpable conduct or negligence.43 However, as a result of
hindsight bias, it is likely that jurors, faced with the facts of a young
woman's rape and the transit authority's assertion that it had taken all
reasonable precautions, integrated the testimony about the installation
of fluorescent lighting into their own estimates of what the defendant
knew or should have known, and thereby overestimated how obvious
or possible the installation of lighting appeared as a solution to a
darkened platform based on its subsequent installation. When con-
sidered in light of all other facts, the transit authority's failure to in-
stall the lighting sooner may have appeared less reasonable than it
would have had the evidence never been admitted.
However, a distinction must be made between hindsight bias and
learning from experience. 44 In ordinary circumstances, knowing the
outcome of an event will cause people to update their estimates of the
event's probability; this is simply known as learning from experi-
ence.45 Hindsight bias, on the other hand, occurs when a subject is
asked to predict the probability of the outcome without using the ul-
timate outcome information.46 In hindsight bias situations, subjects'
estimates of the probability will still rise, even though they have spe-
cifically been asked not to update their information base. The result-
ing estimate reflects hindsight bias; once we know the information, it
is virtually impossible not to update our information base, or to skew
our estimates in favor of a higher probability that is more in line with
the actual outcome of the event.47
Researchers have attempted to reconcile the subtle differences be-
tween hindsight bias and learning from experience with a model of
42 Kenny v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 581 F.2d 351, 355-56.
43 Id. at 356. Testimonial evidence of the subsequent remedial measure was admitted for
the limited purposes of impeachment and feasibility. Id. at 355-56.
44 Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 576-77.
45 Id. For example, where a person has learned from experience, while he will update his
current estimate of the event's probability, he will not revise his estimate of what he knew in
advance of the outcome based on the new information. Translating this to a trial setting, while
the jury may increase its current estimate of the injury's probability based on the various facts of
a case, it will not necessarily integrate the new information into its perception of what the de-
fendant knew, or should have known, before the injury occurred.
46 This distinction is important, because when evidence of subsequent remedial measures
is presented at trial, the jury is being asked to consider measures taken after the accident without
using those measures as an indicator of culpable conduct or negligence.
47 Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 576-77.
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hindsight bias called Reconstruction After Feedback with Take the
Best (RAF). 48 RAFT seeks to explain why our impression of how
we acted or would have acted changes when we learn the outcome of
the event. Hindsight bias can occur when people make a judgment or
choice but, afterward, are told what the "correct" judgment would
have been.49 When asked to recall what their own judgment was,
subjects' memory of their own judgment often reflects bias toward
the new information, demonstrating the effects of hindsight bias.
The RAFT model postulates that any feedback or correct informa-
tion a person is given after he has indicated his initial judgment effec-
tively "updates" the subject's knowledge base underlying the initial
judgment.5° While the feedback does not directly affect the memory
for the original response, it indirectly affects the memory for the sub-
sequent response by updating the knowledge used to reconstruct the
correct response. 5' The RAFT model has been applied to subjects'
knowledge of political events, nutritional values, as well as current
events and is particularly applicable to subjects' rationales for choos-
ing one outcome over another.52 Application of the RAFT model may
suggest why evidence of subsequent remedial measures exacerbates
the hindsight bias. Jurors, presented with evidence of the defendant's
conduct after the injury has occurred, have the benefit of the ability to
update their memory or cognitive biases in order to reconstruct what
the defendant should have done-the "correct" or "reasonable" re-
sponse to the danger-in order to more closely coincide with the evi-
dence of a subsequent remedial measure. Therefore, application of
the RAFT model would seem to indicate that the hindsight bias would
grow stronger with evidence of subsequent remedial measures and
that a defendant would be more likely to be found negligent for not
having acted in the "correct" manner.
Knowing how and why people update their knowledge base may
prove critical in a negligence trial, particularly where evidence of ex
48 Press Release, American Psychological Association, Hindsight Bias - Not Just a Con-
venient Memory Enhancer but an Important Part of an Efficient Memory System (May 14,
2000), available at http://www.apa.org/releases/hindsight.html.
49 Id.
50 Ulrich Hoffrage et al., Hindsight Bias: A By-Product of Knowledge Updating?, 26 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 566, 567 (2000).
51 Id.
52 Id. Hoffrage has noted that "hindsight bias emerges because of systematic differences
between judging and rejudging the outcome." Id. The RAFT model is based on three general
assumptions. First, it assumes that if the original response can't be retrieved from the subject's
memory, it will be reconstructed by rejudging the event. Second, it assumes that the rejudg-
ment involves a basic recall of the cues underlying the original choice or memory. Finally, it is
assumed that uncertain knowledge is automatically updated by feedback. The by-product of this
updating is hindsight bias. Id.
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post measures is introduced. Hindsight bias, in non-litigation situa-
tions, is an adaptive and desirable process, as is the process of learn-
ing from experience. However, in a litigation situation, hindsight bias
presents special problems. In particular, jurors are told that the de-
fendant made a particular choice (for instance, to maintain an old
incandescent lighting system) and then are told that, after an injury or
other event (such as a violent rape), the defendant made the "correct"
decision (installing brighter fluorescent lights). In updating their
knowledge base with the "correct" judgment,53 jurors' memories of
their own judgment of the risk and benefits will likely reflect bias
toward the new information. Jury deliberations, which occur in a
group setting, may exacerbate this phenomenon. Thus, in the distinc-
tive context of laying blame and liability for failure to do something
that may have ultimately prevented an injury, hindsight bias presents
an acute danger to defendants who acted, or declined to act, without
the benefit of hindsight.
B. Hindsight Bias and the Law
1. "[J]udgments tainted by hindsight bias can have serious
consequences for decision makers and for those who depend on
them. 54
Psychologists and legal scholars have expressed concern at the ad-
verse impact hindsight bias may have on defendants in negligence
cases.55 Because hindsight bias makes outcomes seem more predict-
able in hindsight than they were ex ante, prior conduct tends to be
judged more harshly than it would be if the individual were unaware
of the outcome. 56 Specifically, the presence of hindsight bias in the
courtroom presents three challenges to the legal system: first, a psy-
chological jurisprudential system demands a full understanding of the
roles of psychology and the law in order to affect the best or "right"
outcome; second, hindsight bias can result in the negligence standard
being converted to a strict liability system, creating economic ineffi-
ciencies; and third, punitive damages awards or inordinately high
53 In the context of evidence of a subsequent remedial measure, this "correct" judgment is
a measure taken after the injury occurs, not the injury itself.
54 Therese A. Louie, Decision Makers' Hindsight Bias After Receiving Favorable and Un-
favorable Feedback, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 29 (1999).
55 See, e.g., Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 32; Rachlinski, supra note 23. But see Galen
V. Bodenhausen, Second-Guessing the Jury: Stereotypic and Hindsight Biases in Perceptions of
Court Cases, 20 J. APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 1112 (1990) (finding that no hindsight bias was
evident in judgments of cases involving stereotyped criminal defendants).
56 Peters, supra note 13, at 1277.
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damages awards resulting from hindsight bias may wrongly compen-
sate for a defendant's otherwise reasonable behavior.
a. Psychological Jurisprudence
The study of psychological jurisprudence seeks to provide a nor-
mative theory of the manner in which the social sciences and psy-
chology interact with the law and our legal processes.57 Scholars
have suggested that psychology and the social sciences provide a
unique lens through which to view the application of the law and its
effects on society and the promotion of our nation's values.58
By understanding the impact of psychological phenomena like
hindsight bias, the legal system can correct flawed processes in order
to effect the correct or fair outcome. However, in order to achieve
this goal, the effects of legal doctrine on the behavior of individuals
and the manner in which legal consciousness is acquired must be con-
sidered.59 In the context of hindsight bias and the subsequent reme-
dial measures rule, this means that, before evidence of a subsequent
remedial measure is introduced, the attorneys presenting and defend-
ing against the evidence as well as the judge presiding over the ad-
mission of the evidence must be aware of the impact of the evidence
on the jurors' cognitive functions. Although social psychologists and
legal scholars have devoted enormous efforts to understanding and
explaining why people attribute causality and fault to the actions of
other individuals,6° the general lack of understanding or acknowl-
edgement of the impact of hindsight bias, particularly the negative
impact on the jury's perception of the defendant's conduct, presents a
significant challenge to our legal system in negligence cases.
b. Economic Inefficiencies
Hindsight bias makes it incredibly difficult for tort defendants to
convince judges and juries that their actions fell within the standard of
reasonable care.61 As a result of hindsight bias, the application of a
negligence standard-which asks jurors to consider the defendant's
conduct in light of the standard of reasonable care and foreseeabil-
57 Richard L. Wiener, Social Analytic Jurisprudence and Tort Law: Social Cognition
Goes to Court, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 503, 508 (1993).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 508-09.
60 Id. at 523.
61 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Regulating in Foresight Versus Judging Liability in Hindsight:
The Case of Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REv. 813, 825 (1999) (discussing hindsight bias's challenges in
product liability cases).
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ity-may result in a kind of strict liability.62 The application of a
strict liability standard, or the threat of a quasi-strict liability standard,
63
may lead to inefficient excesses of precaution. When the bias is
sufficiently pronounced, 64 a quasi-strict liability system may overde-
ter subsequent remedial measures by raising costs of acting to pro-
hibitive levels.
65
If jurors are subject to hindsight bias, defendants may be found
negligent in situations where they acted in the most socially efficient
manner, or with reasonable care, but were struck by bad luck.6 6 This
provides potential defendants "with a private incentive to take an in-
efficiently high amount of precaution," possibly at a prohibitively
high cost.67 The resulting inefficiencies create a regime that is eco-
nomically inefficient from both a legal and social perspective.
c. Unwarranted Damages Awards
The most pronounced challenge presented by hindsight bias in the
courtroom is that of unwarranted or unfair damages awards or the
imposition of punitive damages on defendants who acted reasonably
but, because of hindsight bias, were adjudicated to have been negli-
gent. Cass Sunstein and her associates have examined the general
effect of hindsight bias on punitive damages awards.68 Sunstein's
studies showed generally that mock jurors exhibited a "variety of
irrationalities regarding risk that would distort their judgment in as-
sessing liability and awards in safety and environmental tort."69 In a
railroad accident case study, two thirds of mock jurors who were
asked to make ex ante foresight predictions of risk probability and
decisions regarding the implementation of safety measures approved
the fictitious request to allow the railroad to continue its operations
as-is. 70 But two thirds of the ex post jurors, who were given the same
description of the problem but were also told that an accident had
occurred, determined that the railroad's behavior was reckless and
62 Id.
63 Kyron Huigens, Review Essay, Law, Economics, and the Skeleton of Value Fallacy Be-
havioral Law and Economics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 537, 563 (2001).
64 This may be the case in those jurisdictions where the threat of admission of subsequent
remedial measures is significantly higher due to a loose definition of "feasible."
65 Huigens, supra note 63, at 563.
66 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1096 (2000).
67 Id. at 1097.
68 CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE (2002).
69 Id. at 24.
70 Id. at 189.
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that the railroad should be held liable for punitive damages. 7' This
discrepancy appears to corroborate Judge Easterbrook's characteriza-
tion that "[the] ex post perspective of litigation exerts a hydraulic
force that distorts judgment." 72
Sunstein's findings are not inconsistent with the results of analo-
gous studies, including mock-jury studies of the judgment of negli-
gence. A study by Kim A. Kamin and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski specifi-
cally addressed hindsight bias in jury settings, noting that decision-
making in a legal context differs from non-legal decision making.
While common sense might indicate that the increased complexity of
legal decision making might lower the prevalence of hindsight bias,
the Kamin and Rachlinski study suggested that "neither the attitudinal
variables 73 nor the complexity of legal decisions appears to mitigate
the bias' effect. 74
Kamin and Rachlinski postulated that hindsight bias in the jury
room "ensures that some reasonable defendants will feel ambushed by
adverse liability judgments after an accident has occurred. 75  They
suggested that the presence of hindsight bias in the jury room may be
interpreted as "a pervasive flaw in the deterrence model of torts, 76
where requiring negligent defendants to compensate plaintiffs forces
them to internalize the social costs of their actions, thereby encourag-
ing them to make socially correct choices about the costs and benefits
77of precaution. The severe implications of hindsight bias are even
more clear in the deterrence model of the subsequent remedial meas-
ures rule, where evidence is generally excluded in order to encourage
ex post safety precautions, preventing would-be defendants from
spending more on safety precautions than a cost-benefit analysis
would justify in foresight.78
71 Id. at 190. The railroad case study also compared jurors' exhibited hindsight bias withjudges' exhibited hindsight bias. The study found that "[judges'] attitudes change very little
across the foresight and hindsight cases, whereas there was a stark increase in citizens/jurors'
antirailroad sentiment in the hindsight case."
72 Id. at 188 (quoting Carroll v. Otis Elevator, 896 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1990)).
73 "Attitudinal variables" may include factors such as the respondent's gender, race, age,
socioeconomic status, occupation, overall life satisfaction, political orientation, personal beliefs
on the subject matter being discussed, religious attachments, educational background or per-
sonal history. See, e.g., M. Juliet Bonazzoli, Note, Jury Selection and Bias: Debunking Invidi-
ous Stereotypes Through Science, 18 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 247, 248 (1998); Social Sciences
Data Collection, European Communities Studies, 1970-1992: Cumulative File, available at
http://ssdc.ucsd.edu/ssdc/icpO9361.html (listing various attitudinal variables at play in court-
rooms and in sociological studies, respectively).
74 Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante: Determining Liability in
Hindsight, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 91 (1995).
75 Id. at 101.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 101-02.
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For instance, in Kenny, the transit authority was justified to be
nervous that the jurors would "update" their perception of the reason-
ableness of installing the fluorescent lighting, based on the transit
authority's subsequent installation of the fluorescent lighting four
days after the rape. If Kamin and Rachlinski are correct, any precau-
tion taken after the fact could ultimately give rise to liability, even if
that precaution could not reasonably have been justified before the
injury occurred. 7 9 Jurors were likely to perceive that the transit au-
thority should have known that having one end of the platform darker
than the center of the platform could result in that darkened area be-
ing used for a crime, even though the transit authority was not privy
to the benefit of hindsight. As such, jurors were more likely to assess
liability, no matter how careful or reasonable the defendant's actions
may, in reality, have been or how feasible the defendant had con-
cluded the safety measure was before the accident occurred. It is
therefore clear that such a bias can have a significant effect not only
on punitive damages awards, but on the simple determination of neg-
ligence.
80
2. The Reasonable Person Standard and the effect of Hindsight
Bias's Effect on the Traditional Model of Negligence
Hindsight bias may also cause jurors to impose a reasonable per-
son standard that is unreasonable and unachievable by the average
person. 81 While an underestimation of cognitive abilities presents few
dangers to a defendant, the jury's overestimation of a defendant's
cognitive abilities presents a significant problem for the defendant
and the legal system as a whole.82 An overestimation of cognitive
abilities creates an idealistic, unachievable ex post reasonable person,
which does not necessarily reflect an individual's actual abilities.83
79 See id. at 101.
80 It is of some note that legal scholars are already addressing the effect of hindsight bias
on the litigation that has arisen as a result of the 9/11 tragedy. See Neal R. Feigenson, Emo-
tions, Risk Perceptions and Blaming in 9/11 Cases, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 959 (2003). Feigenson
noted "[i]f we presume that jurors may believe that practically no precaution would be deemed
too great in the face of such a serious risk [as a terrorist attack], jurors may well believe that a
party who failed to do more to avoid that risk should be blamed for not having done so." Id. at
995. Feigenson dubbed this outcome "increased blaming via the hindsight bias," and stated that,
in the 9/11 cases, measures must be taken to mitigate the effects of hindsight bias on already
emotional juries. Id. at 995-97.
81 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68
BROOK. L. REv. 1055, 1056-57 (2003) (discussing recent research that indicates "people com-
monly overestimate cognitive abilities" leading juries to compare a tort defendant's conduct to
that of a superhero rather than that of a reasonable person).
82 Id. at 1071.
83 See id. at 1075.
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"[O]verstating people's ability to avoid accidents generally leads
judges and juries to brand as negligent conduct that was reason-
able."84 Such overestimation of the defendant's ex ante abilities, de-
veloped in light of ex post information provided during trial, may be
unjust or worse still, may cause the traditional model of negligence to
more closely resemble a system of negligence per se, or de facto strict
liability. 85  Rachlinski suggests that this conversion could minimize
or eliminate many of the legal incentives created by tort law, and
could ultimately affect tort law's "ability to promote corrective jus-
tice. ,,
86
While strict liability does not generate undesirable incentives with
respect to the standard of care actors are required to take, it generates
a different set of incentives that, economically, contradict the incen-
tives of traditional negligence.87 A traditional or de jure negligence
scheme permits someone who takes all reasonable precautions against
causing an injury to save money by avoiding liability, thereby lower-
ing the cost of the activity. Additional measures that are not justified
by the cost-benefit analysis inefficiently impose costs on the actor
without conferring any benefit.88 Strict liability, on the other hand,
imposes liability for all harm the actor's activities cause, whether he
takes reasonable precautions or not. The actor is rewarded for his
safety measures by fewer accidents, and fewer judgments of liabil-
ity.89 However, when a system of strict liability is unintended, or
where strict liability supplants traditional negligence after the fact, the
cost of the underlying activity is raised ex post, and the economic
benefit of traditional negligence theory-reducing the costs of activi-
ties-is eliminated. 90
Because hindsight bias research suggests that people commonly
update and revise the probability and likelihood of events based on
outcome knowledge and overestimate cognitive abilities, jurors in
negligence cases are at risk of producing decisions that are inconsis-
tent with ordinary notions of fairness and justice.91 Such a systematic
error can prejudice defendants and undermine the legal system's abil-
ity to induce potential defendants to take precautions against injuring




87 See id. at 1076.
88 See id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1077.
91 Id. at 1057.
92 Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 596.
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blesome is in the feasibility exception to the subsequent remedial
measures rule of evidence.
II. NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL
MEASURES RULE
A. The Definition of "Negligence" and the Limits of Foresight
In actions for negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
owed him a duty of care, that the defendant breached that duty, and
that the breach of duty caused the damage or injury to the plaintiff.
93
In determining whether the defendant was negligent, jurors must de-
cide whether the defendant's actions were reasonable at the time, and
whether the defendant should have reasonably foreseen the result of
his actions. 94 While jurors struggle to separate the defendant's ac-
tions before the injury (ex ante) from his actions after the injury (ex
post) in making their final determination of negligence, it is clear that
courts disfavor the use of hindsight to determine whether a resulting
injury was foreseeable.
For example, one Tennessee court, faced with a school-time in-
jury, addressed the question of whether the school should have fore-
seen that a student would assault another student, causing a serious
injury.95 The school administration's knowledge of the danger was
directly at issue. The court concluded that while "hindsight is
20/20,',96 "the law defines negligence by the standard of foreseeabil-
ity, not that of hindsight., 97 Similar language can be found in a New
York negligence case: "proof that goes to hindsight rather than fore-
sight most often is entirely irrelevant and, at best, of low probative
value."
98
When evidence of a subsequent remedial measure is introduced at
trial, the jury is already aware that an accident or injury has occurred,
an outcome that inherently generates hindsight bias in the jury. The
jury is also made aware of the allegation that this remedial measure, if
it had been taken prior to the injury in question, may have prevented
the accident. In order for this evidence to be presented to the jury
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, §§ 281-83, 285, 298 (1965).
94 Id. at § 283 (1965).
95 Denson v. Benjamin, 1999 WL 824346, No. 01A019810CV00571 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Aug. 12, 1999). This case did not address any evidence of subsequent remedial measures, and
is used only as an example of the general tendency of courts to eschew use of hindsight in
determinations of negligence.
96 Id. at *6.
97 Id.
98 Maria E. v. 599 West Assocs., 726 N.Y.S.2d 237, 242 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
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under the feasibility exception, the defendant and plaintiff must es-
sentially disagree as to the feasibility of the measure - a position that,
given the successful implementation of the measure after the injury,
places the defendant at odds with his own ex post actions. Evidence
of the subsequent remedial measure therefore exacerbates the already
existing hindsight bias by presenting a new outcome speaking directly
to the defendant's actions prior to the injury.99 In deliberations, the
jury is required to make an ex post determination of what the defen-
dant could have or should have done before the injury occurred.' ° In
order to decide liability without prejudice, jurors must find a way to
make this determination without considering the negative inference
that goes hand in hand with evidence of the subsequent remedial
measure; they must determine the defendant's liability based solely
on before-the-fact probabilities and knowledge.°10
Jurors are regularly asked to put themselves in the defendant's
shoes at the time of the allegedly negligent conduct. Those same ju-
rors are also told that, in some cases, a horrible accident has occurred,
supposedly as a result of the defendant's conduct, and that something
the defendant did after the injury, if done before the injury, could
have prevented it. While research has repeatedly suggested that peo-
ple cannot ignore a known outcome when assessing the likelihood of
an event, 102 the standard of negligence as applied in practice requires
that jurors make determinations of reasonableness from the perspec-
tive of the defendant at the time the precautions were taken, without
permitting their knowledge of subsequent events to influence their
determination. 0 3 But where evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures is introduced and admitted at trial, hindsight bias inherent in neg-
ligence cases will only be aggravated by the juror's knowledge of
subsequent events, resulting in systematic unfairness to defendants. °4
B. The Rule Itself
In a seeming appreciation of the hindsight bias problem, the com-
mon law developed the rule that evidence of subsequent remedial
measures was to be excluded as an admission of fault. 05 The com-
mon-law rule rejected the general notion that "because the world gets
99 See supra notes 48-52.




103 Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 571.
104 Peters, supra note 13, at 1277.
105 FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
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wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before.' 106 The Federal
Rules of Evidence, enacted in their original form in 1975, codified the
common-law rule by prohibiting admission of subsequent remedial
measures to prove negligence. Rule 407 rejects the inference that
fault is admitted by implementation of a subsequent remedial meas-
ure,' °7 indicating at least a minimal awareness of the phenomenon that
would come to be known as "hindsight bias." Subsequent remedial
measures are those that, if taken previously, would have made the
injury or harm less likely to occur. "[E]vidence of the subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence, [or] culpable
conduct . . . .,,10 Therefore, to be admitted, the evidence must be
introduced for a purpose other than to show negligence, such as to
establish ownership, control, or feasibility.11 9 Admission under these
guises is not automatic, though; evidence of a subsequent remedial
measure to show ownership, control, or feasibility is only admissible
when one of these are controverted, such as when the defendant dis-
putes the plaintiff s theory of ownership, control, or feasibility.
When Congress enacted the subsequent remedial measures rule,
they articulated two reasons for the general exclusion of subsequent
remedial measures in cases of negligence. 1 The advisory committee
followed a common-law assumption that evidence of a subsequent
remedial measure should not generally be construed as an implied
admission of fault, because "the conduct is equally consistent with
injury by mere accident or through contributory negligence." '' Con-
gress recognized that there could be a myriad of explanations for im-
plementing a subsequent remedial measure, reasons that may have
nothing to do with any perception or admission of negligence; one
might enact a remedial measure as an emotional reaction to the injury
or simply to prevent another similar accident from happening, which
may be indicative of either contributory negligence or a post hoc
abundance of caution on the defendant's part.'
2
106Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T.R. 261, 263 (Ex. Ch. 1869). See FED.
R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
07 "[T]he conduct is equally consistent with injury by mere accident or through contribu-
tory negligence." FED. R. EvsD. 407 advisory committee's note.
108 FED. R. EvID. 407.
109 FED. R. EvtD. 407 advisory committee's note.
"Old.
"I Id.
112 The evidence must, of course, be relevant to the case as determined under Federal Rule
of Evidence 401, and must pass the court's application of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as to
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues or misleading the jury. See FED. R. EVyD. 407 advisory
committee's note.
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Furthermore, the exclusionary rule was intended to encourage
people to take such measures for the future safety of others.113 The
advisory committee's notes to the Federal Rule of Evidence 407 indi-
cate that Congress felt that limited admissibility would promote the
social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not be discour-
aged from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety. 4 It was Con-
gress's concern that without the rule, potential defendants would not
implement remedial safety measures due to their fear of the measures
being construed as an implied admission of fault by the jury's infer-
ence that the measure's enactment indicated the defendant's aware-
ness of fault. "A major purpose of Rule 407 is to promote safety by
removing the disincentive to make repairs (or take other safety meas-
ures) after an accident that would exist if the accident victim could
use those measures as evidence of the defendant's liability."' 5  In
other words, Congress felt that the rule was needed to avoid the harm-
ful social consequences that would result from an absence of such a
rule.
116
In spite of Congress's concern that admissibility would ultimately
discourage people from taking subsequent remedial measures for fear
of how such a measure would be perceived in court, it declined to
make the rule absolute, and determined that subsequent remedial
measures should be admissible in limited instances. Perhaps believ-
ing that clever attorneys would never exploit the "if controverted"
language of the rule, or even knowing full well that that would be the
result, the committee allowed evidence of remedial measures when
ownership, control, or feasibility was genuinely at issue. In such
cases, the trial court's discretion under Rule 403, invoking considera-
tions of unfair prejudice, misleading the jury, confusion of the issues
and waste of time, was to act as a check on the admission to ensure
fairness for the opponent of the evidence.' 7
Clearly, though, many attorneys did notice the weakness in the "if
controverted" language of the rule and have sought to exploit the
vagueness of the text.'' 8 Attorneys have continued to find more and
13 FED. R. EviD. 407 advisory committee's note.
114Id.
"
5 Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984).
"
6 However, it has been noted that, in some cases, the mere possibility that the evidence
may be used against the defendant at all inhibits subsequent repairs or improvements. See
David Wadsworth, Casenote, Forma Scientific v. Biosera and the Admissibility of Evidence of
Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Products Liability Actions, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 757,
773 (2000).
117 FED. R. EvD. 407 advisory committee's note.
118 See, e.g., Anderson v. Malloy, 700 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that "'feasible'
means not only 'possible,' but also means 'capable of being... utilized, or dealt with success-
fully"'); Ray v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 696 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1996) (applying a broad definition of
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more ways to admit evidence of subsequent remedial measures, per-
haps with the underlying purpose of demonstrating the defendant's
negligence by inference. And one of the easiest ways to do that is
under the feasibility exception. " 9
C. The Meaning of "Feasibility"
The ownership and control exceptions tend to facilitate an answer
to the question, "Who is the appropriate defendant?" Based in prop-
erty and employment law, definitions of ownership and control are
fairly well-settled, and evidence related to ownership or control can
help to determine if the plaintiff has named the correct defendant in
the action at bar. In such cases, a defendant's implementation of a
remedial measure may indicate that the defendant owned or was in
control of the instrumentality of harm before the accident, thereby
indicating that he is the appropriate defendant in the action.' 20 On the
other hand, the feasibility exception of the subsequent remedial
measures rule essentially answers the question "why wasn't the sub-
sequent remedial measure implemented before the injury occurred?"
The issue of feasibility pertains directly to the defendant's actions
both before and after the injury occurred; definitions of feasibility run




Unless the definition of "feasible" differs significantly and dis-
cernibly from "reasonable," the exception runs the risk of swallowing
the rule 22 because the defendant must be able to successfully contro-
vert the allegation that his actions were unreasonable. Merriam-
Webster's dictionary primarily defines "feasible" as "capable of being
done or carried out," secondarily defining it as "capable of being used
or dealt with successfully."'123 Presenting a problem for defendants,
"feasible" to include what the defendant "could have learned"); City of Indianapolis v. Swan-
son, 439 N.E.2d 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (defining feasibility based on the potential effective-
ness of the measure); Brookshire Bros. v. Lewis, 911 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App. 1995) (defining
"feasible" as "economically feasible").
119 ABA, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF EvIDENCE 67 (Gregory P.
Joseph et al. eds., 3d ed. 1998).
120See Lee v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 249 F.3d 362, 365-66 (5th Cir. 2001) (evi-
dence of remedial measure admitted to prove that the defendant owner of a chemical plant was
in de facto control of the worksite at the time of the injury, thus allowing the defendant to be
held liable); Woolard v. Mobil Pipe Line Co., 479 F.2d 557, 563 (5th Cir. 1973) (evidence of
remedial measure admissible to resolve dispute as to whether the defendant controlled the
premises in question).
121 ABA, supra note 119, at 67.
122 See cases cited supra note 10.
123 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 458 (11 th ed. 2003).
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however, "feasible" is also defined, in a third option, as "reasonable"
or "likely.' 24 But there are varying definitions of "feasibility" in the
courts, particularly when used in reference to whether a defendant has
controverted the feasibility of an alleged subsequent remedial meas-
ure. While a few courts employ a narrow definition of "feasibility"
consistent with the primary dictionary definition, making it relatively
difficult for a plaintiff to present evidence of the subsequent remedial
measure, 125 a greater number of circuits, and many state courts, em-
ploy broader definitions, in some cases going well beyond the dic-
tionary's secondary definition of "capable of being used or dealt with
successfully."'
126
As noted earlier, the Third Circuit's definition of "feasibility" in
Kenny is by far the broadest definition of all, opening the door to evi-
dence of a subsequent remedial measure when the defendant claims
that "all reasonable care was being exercised at the time,"' 127 a defini-
tion that essentially encompasses the defensive position in virtually
all negligence actions in which negligence itself is controverted. Un-
der the Third Circuit's construction, the plaintiff may respond to the
defendant's contention that his actions were reasonable under the
circumstances by showing that later repairs or actions taken were
inconsistent with the pre-injury actions.128
The Third Circuit's construction is the most amenable to admis-
sion of the remedial measure and places defendants in a legal Catch-
22: if a defendant in a negligence case denies that his actions were
unreasonable, he runs the risk that the subsequent remedial measure
will be admitted on the basis of controverted feasibility; if he fails to
deny negligence, the measure may not be admitted, but he will have
conceded that his actions were not reasonable, satisfying one of the
elements of negligence. 129  Quite literally, in the Third Circuit, by
124Id.
1- See, e.g., Brookshire Bros. v. Lewis, 911 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex. App. 1995) (applying
Texas Rule of Evidence 407 to conclude that a clear controversion of the possibility, economic
feasibility, or efficacy of the measure is required before evidence of the measure can be admit-
ted).
126 See, e.g., Espeaignnette v. Gene Tierney Co., Inc., 43 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1994) (defin-
ing "feasible" as "possible and practical"); Anderson v. Malloy, 700 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir.
1983) (defining "feasible" as "not only possible, but also meaning capable of being... utilized,
or dealt with successfully").
12 7 Kenny v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 581 F.2d 351, 356 (3d Cir. 1978). Note
that, under the rule developed in Kenny, it would appear as though the defendant must articulate
his belief in the reasonableness of his actions on the stand, at which point the evidence may be
used for impeachment purposes-specifically, to impeach the witness on his statement about the
feasibility, or reasonableness, of the measure. Surely, under this construction, the exception
wholly swallows the rule.
128 Id.
129 By failing to deny negligence in his answer, a defendant would be deemed to have judi-
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denying on the stand that his actions were unreasonable, a defendant
runs a palpable risk that any subsequent remedial measures taken will
be admitted to show feasibility, the definition of which is consistent
with "reasonableness," a fact that the jury is supposed to determine.
As a consequence, feasibility and the admitted evidence of the subse-
quent remedial measure speak directly to negligence, a result that is
expressly barred by the language of the rule.
Rule 407 specifically prohibits admission of evidence to prove
negligence or culpable conduct. However, the Third Circuit uses the
impeachment exception in combination with a broad definition of
"feasibility" to get around this limitation, permitting the plaintiff to
admit the evidence when the defendant asserts on the stand that his
actions were reasonable.1 30  At this point, the opponent of the evi-
dence is left to rely on Rules 402 and 403 to keep evidence of the
subsequent remedial measure out, arguing that the evidence is irrele-
vant1 31 or that it is unfairly prejudicial, risks a confusion of the issues,
misleads the jury, or wastes time. 132
By giving a broad definition to the term "feasibility," courts have
lowered the bar on the degree of dispute required to allow admission.
As a result, the avenues to admission of evidence of subsequent re-
medial measures are widening. To be sure, some disputes of the fea-
sibility of a remedial measure are vigorous, and in some of those
cases, the issue of admissibility is clear. But a defense witness or the
defendant himself may also unwittingly open the door to the admis-
sion of the remedial measure by testifying that he did not believe the
measure was practical or that he believed the measures in effect at the
time of the accident were the best available. 133 Where broad defini-
tions of "feasible' are used, a comment on the stand that the defen-
dant's actions were reasonable under the circumstances, as in the
Kenny case, or an inadvertent statement by a manager or executive
that the decision-makers looked at the measure and determined that
cially admitted negligence, a response that would be binding at trial. A stipulation to negligence
would be similarly binding.130 By defining "feasible" in such a way as is consistent with "reasonableness," by the
term's very definition, the evidence should be excluded. See Kenny, 581 F.2d at 356.
131 FED. R. EvID. 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.").
132 FED. R. EviD. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
' is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.").
133 ROGER C. PARK, TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK ch. 2, tit. 111, § 2:45, 2-111 (2d ed.
2001).
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other options were better, may bring feasibility into controversy and
'facilitate admitting of evidence of the subsequent remedial measure.
While the Federal Rules of Evidence purport to curb the danger by
admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures only on a lim-
ited basis, such as when ownership, control, or feasibility is contro-
verted, such exceptions, due in part to varying definitions of "feasi-
ble," are in danger of becoming the rule. The application of varying
definitions exposes defendants to the danger that the jury will mis-
construe the evidence in light of the maxim that "hindsight is 20/20,"
and that jurors will conclude that if the measure were possible, practi-
cal, or prudent after the accident, then it was possible, practical, or
prudent before the accident. Such a conclusion is precisely what the
rule expressly forbids: using evidence of an ex post subsequent reme-
dial measure to prove negligence ex ante. Yet this is precisely what
hindsight bias's effect on jurors' perceptions of evidence of a subse-
quent remedial measure achieves.
HI. THE EFFECT OF HINDSIGHT BIAS ON THE JURY'S PERCEPTION OF
A SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURE
At trial, evidence of a subsequent remedial measure provides the
jury with information about an ex post outcome that, but for the lim-
ited exceptions of the rule, would be relevant but inadmissible. t34 The
evidence acts as a post-script to the story; under the feasibility excep-
tion, such evidence is only admissible to show that the measure was
in fact possible, practical, or reasonable, depending on the applicable
definition. In cases where the definition of "feasibility" is broad, the
question of feasibility considerably exacerbates the already-existing
hindsight bias problem. 35 "Admitting such evidence would not only
leave the defendant subject to the ordinary version of hindsight
bias... but it would also tempt the jury with more detailed evidence
of the consequences of the defendant's initial decision.' 1 36
Where evidence of a subsequent remedial measure is admitted as a
result of the defendant's controversion of the plaintiffs assertion of
feasibility, the jury is made aware of an ex post outcome-the defen-
dant's judgment that the subsequent remedial measure is
advisable-that the law would otherwise prohibit as evidence of ex
ante negligence.1 37 Knowing that an outcome has occurred tends to
increase its perceived ex ante likelihood, necessity, or reasonableness.
134 See FED. R. EvID. 402; FED. R. EviD. 403.
135 Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 618.
136 Id.
137 FED. R. EvID. 407.
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Events that have already occurred are perceived to be inevitable, and
this perceived inevitability is often believed to have been apparent
with foresight as well as with the benefit of hindsight. Thus, evidence
of a subsequent remedial measure is likely to increase a juror's per-
ception that the defendant knew the measure was more necessary,
more possible, more practical, or more reasonable, before the injury.
The increased perception of likelihood can be likened to the per-
ception of reasonableness in the context of subsequent remedial
measures. Specifically, there is a danger that jurors will too readily
perceive that if the measure was possible, practical, or reasonable
after the accident, it was possible, practical, or reasonable before the
accident. If jurors perceive the implementation of the subsequent
remedial measure ex post to be reasonable, they may be too likely to
infer that the failure to implement the measure ex ante was unreason-
able. This inference is reinforced by the fact that the injury or harm
that the defendant now seeks to avoid by implementation of the
measure did occur.
Consistent with hindsight bias's effect on jurors' perceptions of the
reasonable person, there is a significant risk that the jury will perceive
that the defendant had the overestimated cognitive ability to perceive
the measure as necessary, practical, or reasonable. A jury's applica-
tion of an overestimated cognitive ability with regard to the remedial
measure's necessity or reasonableness may itself be unreasonable or
unachievable. 38 Because the defendant has demonstrated, by the act
of implementing the measure, that it was at some point practical, pos-
sible, or reasonable is precisely whay he will be perceived by the jury
to have known, or had the ability to know, that the measure was prac-
tical, possible or reasonable ex ante. This misperception reflects the
jury's possible overestimation of the defendant's cognitive ability as a
result of hindsight bias. A jury's determination of the defendant's ex
ante reasonableness (or lack thereof) based on knowledge and infor-
mation acquired by the defendant after the injury is in direct conflict
with the language of the subsequent remedial measures rule. The
jury's determination of the defendant's foresight capabilities through
the integration of a hindsight perspective is also out of sync with the
law of negligence' 39 that requires juries to make an objective determi-
nation of reasonableness from the perspective of the defendant at the
time the precautions were or were not taken, excluding ex post
knowledge of subsequent events as they pertain to negligence. 1
40
138 Rachlinski, supra note 81, at 1071.
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 283 (1965).
140 Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 571.
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The effect of hindsight bias on evidence of a subsequent remedial
measure effectively raises the bar for reasonableness after the injury
or harm occurs, converting the announced negligence rule into a form
of strict liability at trial. This conversion from ordinary negligence to
strict liability makes ex ante decision making and risk analysis diffi-
cult, if not impossible. 141 The conversion also creates inefficiencies,
because, in some cases, businesses and individuals, presented with the
possibility of evidence of a subsequent remedial measure being intro-
duced against them at trial, may take preventative steps before an
injury that are not financially justified or necessary. 142
The shift in perception of the subsequent remedial measure from
evidence admitted for the limited purpose of showing feasibility to
evidence tending to weigh into the determination of reasonableness
has concerned courts for some time, and in fact formed part of the
basis for the rule itself.143 Courts and Congress were concerned that
juries would overreact to the defendant's implementation of subse-
quent remedial measures, the result being that defendants would defer
implementing remedial measures until after the trial, or in some cases,
completely.'44
Admitting evidence of a subsequent remedial measure, combined
with the effects of hindsight bias on the jury's perception of that evi-
dence, may also be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence may, according to the
court's discretion, "be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."' 14' Hindsight bias
causes the jury to determine liability based on hindsight rather than
foresight as the law requires; such a determination, however, is not
the proper basis for apportioning liability in a negligence suit.' 46
Therefore, any evidence that suggests the jury should make its deci-
sion on such a basis should be subjected to a court's Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 analysis and excluded on the basis of unfair prejudice.
As a result of the adverse effect of hindsight bias on our legal sys-
tem, many legal scholars have suggested means for eliminating or
141 See Rachlinski, supra note 81.
142 Peters, supra note 13, at 1284.
143 Rachlinski, supra note 19, at 618.
1 Id. ("If juries do overreact to the defendant taking subsequent remedial measures, then
defendants will be loath to undertake them. The increased probability of paying for the accident
that already occurred might overwhelm the benefits to the defendant of reducing the prospects
of future liability, at least until the trial is over.").
145 FED. R. EviD. 403.
146See FED. R. EVlD. 403 advisory committee's note. ("'Unfair prejudice' within [the con-
text of the rule] means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one.").
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preventing the bias likely to occur in a variety of different cases, in-
cluding medical malpractice. 47 Because "[r]easonableness must be
determined from the perspective of the defendant at the time that the
precautions were taken, but the hindsight bias ensures that subsequent
events will influence that determination,"'' 48 scholars have suggested
the use of limiting jury instructions and suppression of evidence, as
well as changes in the standard of persuasion.149
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
What can be done to mitigate the effects of hindsight bias on evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures? Legal scholars and psy-
chologists have suggested a variety of methods to mitigate hindsight
bias in general, from suppressing evidence to including warnings in
defense counsel's closing arguments. However, one thing seems
clear: if the evidence is going to be admitted, for debiasing techniques
to succeed, the decision-maker must be made aware of the influence
of hindsight bias, motivated sufficiently to correct the bias, aware of
the magnitude and direction the bias will take him, and psychologi-
cally capable of adjusting his response appropriately. 150
A. Elimination of or Amendment to the Feasibility Exception
For the most part, attempts to eliminate hindsight bias through de-
biasing techniques have failed. 15' The most clear and absolute solu-
tion appears to be the suppression of evidence that may be signifi-
cantly colored by hindsight bias. This could be achieved by eliminat-
ing the feasibility exception to the subsequent remedial measures rule.
Eliminating the feasibility exception would effectively allow admis-
sion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures only if ownership
and control are controverted-where there is a question whether this
is the correct defendant-and prohibit evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures when it is offered to show feasibility, which directly or
indirectly implies negligence.
Under the current construction of the rule, the definition of feasi-
bility used by the majority of federal and state courts allows admis-
sion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures even when that
147 SUNSTEIN, supra note 68, at 227.
148 Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 572.
149 Id. at 602-03.
150 Feigenson, supra note 80, at 996.
151 Arkes et al., supra note 19, at 305 (pointing out that both Fischhoff and Wood failed to
eliminate or reduce the effects of hindsight bias through the use of warnings and explanations of
the process).
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evidence is being used by the jury to infer negligence. Such admis-
sion is directly contrary to the language and stated purpose and poli-
cies of the rule. A 1997 amendment to clarify the rule's text, while
eliminating one problem presented by the older language of the rule,
failed to address the vagueness and ambiguity of the "if feasible" lan-
guage, leaving the definition of this term for the courts to decide.
152
The result has been a definition of the phrase that allows admission of
the evidence to show feasibility, but secondarily to show negligence,
particularly in circuits and states like the Third Circuit, where "feasi-
bility" is likened to "reasonableness."
Eliminating the feasibility exception would not only address the
varying definitions of the term, but also congressionally recognize the
adverse effects of hindsight bias. Recognizing the effects of hindsight
bias in the jury room and eliminating the exception that predictably
gives rise to hindsight bias would result in a significant reduction in
unfair prejudice to defendants, and would ultimately serve the pur-
poses and policies behind the rule. Eliminating the debate over feasi-
bility and mitigating the effects of hindsight bias would encourage not
only the very remedial measures addressed in the rule, perhaps im-
proving safety overall, but would also mitigate or eliminate many pre-
trial disputes over whether the feasibility of the measure is actually in
dispute. Dispensing with this debate would reduce the overall cost of
litigation and may even open new channels of dialogue between
plaintiffs and defendants, leading to the resolution of more suits by
settlement. 
153
However, the difficulties of eliminating the feasibility exception
are patently obvious, as it would certainly come up against harsh
criticism by plaintiffs' attorneys and possibly judges in the circuits
favoring broader definitions. Most certainly, it would create a legal
gap when a defendant takes the stand and states that it was impossible
to implement a measure, knowing full well that he successfully im-
plemented the measure shortly after the injury. 154  The public may
52 The 1997 amendment to Rule 407 added language clarifying that the rule applies only
to changes made after the occurrence that produced the injury and limited the admissibility of
subsequent remedial measures in products liability cases. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory commit-
tee's note.
1
53 It should be noted that eliminating the exception in its entirety may, in some cases, tip
the balances in favor of the defendant. However, given the fact that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures to show feasibility almost invariably reflects on the defendant's actions ex
ante, elimination of an ex post factor should not unfairly hinder the plaintiff.
154 Conceivably, though, this challenge could be addressed through the impeachment ex-
ception on cross-examination. However, admitting the evidence under the impeachment excep-
tion may lead to similarly confounding results as are present in the Kenny case.
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also perceive it as anti-plaintiff, such that it may result in other rules
intended to reduce the impact on plaintiffs.
55
On the other hand, a congressional amendment to the rule itself or
an explanatory advisory committee note clarifying and limiting the
term "feasible" to the narrower, primary dictionary definition of "ca-
pable of being done or carried out" may meet with less resistance.
156
While clarifying the term "feasible" would not directly reduce or
eliminate the effects of hindsight bias by the jury, it would at least
restrict the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures
and raise the degree of controversion necessary to admit the evidence,
eliminating the effects of hindsight bias on the jury's perception of
the more frequently suppressed subsequent remedial measure.
One significant challenge of clarifying the term "feasible" in the
subsequent remedial measures rule is that the majority of negligence
cases are brought at the state level under state tort law and using state
evidence law. As a result, any change to Rule 407 would only apply
at the federal level, protecting defendants only in federal courts. A
similar campaign for change would need to be undertaken at the state
level in order to fully address the problem presented by the feasibility
exception and the effect of the hindsight bias. Fortunately, many state
legislatures have adopted rules of evidence similar to the federal
rules, and a change at the federal level may inspire those states to
make similar amendments to their own definitions of "feasible."
B. Jury Instructions
Studies of the effect of hindsight bias on juries have consistently
shown that jury instructions, undertaken as a solitary measure of miti-
gating hindsight bias, are generally ineffective as a means of reducing
its effects. 57 However, the Arkes study indicated that jury instruc-
tions, properly written, combined with jury interrogatories asking for
consideration of alternative theories of liability, may significantly
reduce hindsight bias.
1 58
155 For instance, in response to the limitations on admission of prior bad acts, Congress en-
acted Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415, which allow admission of evidence of similar crimes
in sexual assault and child molestation cases and evidence of similar acts in civil cases involving
sexual assault or child molestation. FED. R. EviD. 413 Report of Judicial Conference of the
United States (1995). See also FED. R. EVID. 413-415.
156 The United States Supreme Court has already adopted the primary dictionary definition
for the term "feasible" as it is used in the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. § 665(b)(5). Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09 (1981).
157See, e.g., Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 74, at 102; Arkes et al., supra note 19, at
305.
158 Arkes et al., supra note 19, at 305.
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Applying a procedure similar to that of Koriat, Fischhoff, and
Lichtenstein, 59 Arkes and his partners discovered that having subjects
list or generate reasons why other outcomes might have been ex-
pected reduced overconfidence in answers and reduced the number of
subjects manifesting hindsight bias.160  As a result of requiring sub-
jects to at least consider alternative outcomes, juries viewed the "cor-
rect" answer as more informative 161 and alternative theories were
given their just due in consideration. 62 This extension of the delib-
eration process resulted in higher accuracy of the ex post conclusion
and countered premature tendencies to end the search for additional
information by encouraging attempts to disconfirm alternate theo-
ries. 161
However, the Kamin and Rachlinski study, which provided mock
jurors with jury instructions warning of the effects of hindsight bias
and instructing them to "take a moment to think of all the ways in
which the event in question may have happened differently or not at
all,'  appears to contradict the outcome suggested by the Arkes
study. Kamin and Rachlinski found that warnings of hindsight bias,
given in jury instructions alone, were insufficiently intrusive to coun-
teract its effects, and noted difficulty with other, more intrusive debi-
asing techniques suggested by psychologists.165  They noted, how-
ever, that their study did not employ such techniques as accompany-
ing instructions detailing the burden of proof or group deliberations,
both of which may boost the effectiveness of passive jury instructions
warning of the effects of hindsight bias.166
Pre-evidence instructions to the jury, outlining the burden of proof
in advance of any presentation of evidence and warning of the effects
of hindsight bias, may help to mitigate the effects of hindsight bias by
making jurors aware of the effects before these effects color the ju-
rors' judgments. 67 Advising jurors of the burden of proof early in the
159 See generally Asher Koriat et al., Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107 (1980).
160 Arkes et al., supra note 19, at 306. Researchers presented subjects with two alternative
questions. Subjects chose the answer they believed to be correct and indicated their confidence
in their given answer. Subjects were also asked to state reasons why each of the two options
maybe correct and why each of the two responses might not be correct before they indicated
their confidence in the chosen answer. These subjects indicated significantly less overconfi-
dence than did the control group subjects, who exhibited levels of confidence far greater than
their actual accuracy.
161 As opposed to conclusive.
162 Arkes et al., supra note 19, at 306.
163 Id.
164 Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 74, at 97.
165 Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 603.
166 Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 74, at 100.
167 Peters, supra note 13, at 1305.
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trial encourages them to take each party's burden of proof more seri-
ously, and juries who receive thorough pre- and post-evidence in-
structions are more likely to defer their decisions until after all of the
evidence and closing arguments are presented. 168 Studies of criminal
juries have produced results indicating that the effects of hindsight
bias may be at least partly mitigated by pre-evidence instructions to
the jury. 169
Kamin and Rachlinski devised and tested a pre-evidence instruc-
tion as well as a final jury instruction, both of which were intended to
mitigate the overall effects of hindsight bias, without addressing any
particular piece of evidence. Using their instructions as a foundation,
a pre-evidence jury instruction could be developed that would address
hindsight bias and subtly address the evidence of a subsequent reme-
dial measure. 170 For example:
Deciding this case will eventually require you to make a de-
termination about whether the defendant acted reasonably.
Making such an assessment may be difficult since the plain-
tiffs injury has already occurred. While listening to the evi-
dence, you should consider how the events that led up to the
accident could have turned out differently, and what alterna-
tives the defendant may have had at his disposal to avoid the
injury. 171
Similarly, a final jury instruction directly addressing both hind-
sight bias and the evidence of subsequent remedial measures might
look like this:
Making a fair determination of feasibility in regard to the
evidence may be difficult, and this may make a fair determi-
nation of the defendant's negligence even more challenging
than it already is. As we all know, hindsight is always 20/20;
it is extremely important that, before you determine the rea-
sonableness of the defendant's actions before the injury oc-
curred, you fully explore the possible alternative measures he
could have taken to avoid that injury. Please take a moment
168Id. at 1306.
169 Id.
170 Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 74, at 95. Evidence of the subsequent remedial meas-
ure should not be directly discussed in this pre-evidence jury instruction because there is always
a chance that the evidence will not be presented at trial.
171 id.
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to think of all the ways in which the event in question may
have happened differently, or not at all. 172
Arkes and others have also indicated that a combination of debias-
ing techniques may be even more effective to mitigate hindsight bias.
They have suggested that a jury instruction warning jurors of the ef-
fects of hindsight bias, combined with jury interrogatories designed to
encourage jurors to consider all theories on the table, may more sig-
nificantly reduce the effects of hindsight bias in the determination of
negligence and liability.173
C. Jury Interrogatories and Special Verdict Forms
While jury interrogatories and special verdict forms may be more
intrusive on the jury's deliberations than simple jury instructions,
special verdict forms that "break down the facts needed to support the
cause of action or a defense" theoretically provide the jury with the
framework to eliminate or mitigate hindsight bias. 174 Special verdict
forms or jury interrogatories merely require yes or no responses from
the jury, but the questions may be framed in such a way to encourage
jurors to consider alternative accounts or to devise fault trees, which
have been found to temper the effects of hindsight bias.
Faced with the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures, defense counsel might request a series of jury interrogato-
ries regarding the presentation of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures that are framed to encourage the jury to consider alternate
outcomes. A specific question, aimed at assessing whether the jury
used the evidence to do more than rebut the defendant's claim of
infeasibility, may mitigate hindsight bias by encouraging the jury to
consider the basis on which their negligence determination is made.
For instance, a defense attorney might ask "would your verdict still be
for the plaintiff if you had not heard either the defendant's denial of
feasibility or the plaintiff's evidence of the defendant's subsequent
remedial measure?" More generic questions, such as "did you con-
sider ways in which the event in question may have happened differ-
ently or not at all?" may help to alleviate the effects of hindsight bias
as it pertains to any evidentiary matters, including evidence of a sub-
sequent remedial measure. Questions pertaining to the burden of
proof and the standard of care applied by the jury in reaching its de-
172 Id. at 97.
173 See Arkes et al., supra note 19, at 305-06; Peters, supra note 13 (suggesting that properjury instructions combined with other efforts may mitigate or eliminate hindsight bias).
174 Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 604.
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termination may also be effective in mitigating the effects of hind-
sight bias or, in the alternative, may provide defendants with grounds
for reversal or appeal if the jury applied an incorrect ex post standard
of care.
175
Of course, the use of jury interrogatories and special verdict forms
may be perceived by some in the legal community as intruding on the
sanctity of the jury deliberations, and some may argue that such tech-
niques present constitutional concerns. However, if done properly,
jury interrogatories or special verdict forms, in combination with jury
pre- and post-evidence instructions, may be highly effective at miti-
gating or eliminating hindsight bias as it affects the jury's perception
of evidence of subsequent remedial measures.
D. Closing Arguments by Defense Counsel
At least one legal scholar has suggested that defense counsel can
also significantly shape the jury's thinking and thought process.
Philip Peters has proposed that defense counsel may be able to allevi-
ate the effects of hindsight bias by employing careful debiasing rheto-
ric in voir dire, the opening statement, examination and presentation
of witnesses and evidence, and the closing argument.
176
Peters has suggested that defense counsel take the opportunity pre-
sented in these instances to communicate to the jury why the plain-
tiff's injury did not necessarily seem inevitable at the time, and why it
would be wrong to assume that bad outcomes are the result of culpa-
ble behavior. 1
77
Applying Peters' recommendation to the context of evidence of
subsequent remedial measures, defense counsel may explain that im-
plementing the subsequent remedial measure did not necessarily seem
practical or necessary under the circumstances ex ante, and that it
would be wrong to assume that the subsequent implementation of the
measure is indicative of negligence or culpable conduct. Defense
counsel may also present the jury with the ability to imagine alterna-
tives that seemed possible ex ante by providing them with reasons
why the defendant felt his choice not to implement the measure
seemed reasonable at the time.
Defense counsel may also use language early in the case that re-
minds jurors that the plaintiff is asking them to be a "Monday-
morning quarterback." This may be reiterated through witness testi-
mony, particularly as it relates to the presentation of evidence of the
175 Peters, supra note 13, at 1290.
176 Id. at 1309.
177 Id.
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remedial measure, and closing arguments, highlighting for the jury
the defendant's position that the plaintiff would prefer them to make
their negligence determination on an ex post rather than the legally
required ex ante basis. Other language may be used to indicate to the
jury that implementing the measure may not necessarily have pre-
vented the injury and that the question of whether it would have pre-
vented the injury can never be answered completely because only
hindsight, not foresight, is 20/20.178
Defense counsel may also take the opportunity during closing ar-
guments to explain the burden of proof as it relates to the subsequent
remedial measure, and remind the jury that the plaintiff is required to
prove that the defendant acted unreasonably before the injury. Coun-
sel may remind the jury that this standard of negligence and the ac-
companying burden of proof, does not permit consideration of ex post
events, like subsequent remedial measures, beyond their limited ad-
missibility to show feasibility of precaution. Defense counsel should
remind the jury not to assume that "because the world gets wiser as it
gets older, therefore it was foolish before."1 79
V. CONCLUSION
A significant problem in a negligence action is whether imple-
menting a subsequent remedial measure should be admissible under
the subsequent remedial measures rule. In many jurisdictions, defen-
dants need only state that their actions were reasonable to have such
evidence admitted. And once admitted, hindsight bias causes juries to
consider the evidence well beyond the limited use of determining the
measure's feasibility before the injury. As a result of hindsight bias,
juries presented with evidence of a subsequent remedial measure are
likely to make determinations of the defendant's negligence based on
an ex post, rather than ex ante, standard, in direct contradiction of the
language of the rule.
There is a strong need in civil courtrooms for a remedy to this
problem and using various debiasing techniques in isolation has
proven to be only minimally successful, if at all, at mitigating hind-
sight bias. This Note has suggested several alternatives for eliminat-
ing or mitigating the effects of hindsight bias on the jury's perception
of evidence of subsequent remedial measures.
First, Congress may consider eliminating the feasibility exception
altogether. While such action would eliminate the effects of hindsight
178 Id. at 1311.
179 Hart v. Lancashire & York Ry. Co., 21 L.T.R. 261, 263 (Ex. Ch. 1869).
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bias on the jurors' perceptions of the defendant's ex post actions in
their entirety, such a drastic measure would meet with strong opposi-
tion and may unfairly tip the balances in favor of defendants. Con-
gress might also consider an amendment or request an advisory com-
mittee note more narrowly defining "feasible" to reflect the primary
dictionary definition of "capable of being done or carried out" rather
than a broader definition, such as the Third Circuit's "reasonable."
Second, in the event that the evidence is admitted to show feasibil-
ity, counsel may want to request pre- and post-evidence jury instruc-
tions that inform the jury of the burden of proof, and that warn jurors
of the negative effects that hindsight bias has on deliberation proc-
esses. While jury instructions on their own have not proven to be
intrusive enough to significantly mitigate the effects of hindsight bias,
when given in combination with other debiasing techniques, jury in-
structions may ultimately prove to be highly effective.18
0
Third, jury interrogatories and special verdict forms may also
prove to be highly effective at debiasing when used in combination
with pre- and post-evidence jury instructions. Counsel should request
a series of questions that reinforce the instructions and ensure that the
jury applies an ex ante standard rather than the ex post standard re-
quired by law. Inconsistent responses from the jury may provide
grounds for reversal or appeal.
Finally, defense counsel may also employ debiasing techniques
throughout trial, from voir dire to closing arguments. Reminding the
jury consistently and constantly of the burden of proof and the effects
of hindsight bias, particularly as they relate to evidence of the subse-
quent remedial measures, may significantly improve juries' determi-
nations of negligence in favor of their clients.
KIMBERLY EBERWINEt
180See Arkes, supra note 15.
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